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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a 
Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMES PIEPENBERG, 
De fendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 14 68 8 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, James Piepenberg, was charged 
with a violation of Salt Lake City's obscenity ordinances, 
Section 32-2-10 et. seq., for displaying the motion picture, 
"Memories Within Miss Aggie". 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant was charged with a violation of 
Section 32-2-10, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City and 
convicted in the Salt Lake City Court. He was sentenced 
by that court to pay a fine of $2 99. An appeal was taken 
to the District Court where the matter was tried to a 
jury before the Honorable Peter Leary and a verdict of 
guilty was returned. A motion in arrest of judgment and 
for a new trial was made and denied and the defendant was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sentenced to serve a sentence of not to exceed six months. 
The trial court executed a certificate of probable cause 
and execution of sentence was stayed pending this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction 
below or, in the alternative, a remand for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The instant case was the fifth prosecution of 
the defendant by Salt Lake City for violation of the City's 
obscenity ordinances arising out of the defendant's dis-
playing of "X-rated" motion pictures at an adults-only 
theater in Salt Lake City. The preceding four prosecutions 
had terminated in the City Court in either acquittals or 
dismissals. The defendant admitted responsibility for 
exhibiting the film and the only issue at trial was whether 
the film was "obscene". 
On the morning of the trial, it became known that 
the Utah Attorney General's Office had conducted a back-
ground investigation of persons called as prospective 
furors, utilizing, among other sources, officials of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. (T-18) 
Both the court and the city prosecutor indicated that if 
-2-
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any juror was aware of the investigation that there would 
be a problem. (T-4) The court inquired of the prospective 
jurors whether any contact had been made with them and 
none indicated there had been. The court admonished a 
deputy attorney general in the presence of Robert Hansen 
that if he had made a statement to a television reporter 
and it was placed on the air it may cause a problem, and 
that deputy indicated that he had already taken care of 
the matter. (T-18, 19) At the next recess, Robert Hansen, 
who was associated as counsel for the plaintiff, (T-27,28) 
gave an interview to a reporter from a television station 
describing the background investigation determining if 
prospective jurors "were pro or anti-pornography" and 
including the fact that bishops in the jurors' wards were 
called. Mr. Hansen also stated that five of the impaneled 
jurors were favorable to the prosecution and two would 
probably hold out for a hung jury. (T-142) These state-
ments were quoted on the 6:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. television 
news broadcast of station KUTV, (T-142, Exhibit 13D) which 
was viewed by four jurors and brought to the attention of 
an additional juror. (T-99) These jurors indicated that 
they would not be influenced by the story to the extent 
that they would be unable to reach a fair and impartial 
verdict. (T-100) 
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During the course of the trial two additional 
jurors informed the court that they had been informed 
of the investigation; Juror Pappas stating that a neigh-
bor had informed her that the Attorney General's Office 
had inquired as to whether she was a good girl or partied 
a lot, (T-161) and Juror Wardle stating that his wife had 
informed him that his ward secretary had called her and 
indicated that someone had called asking questions about 
him, including about his church attendance, (T-162) 
Motions for a mistrial, dismissal, and a new trial based 
upon the defendant's right to an untainted jury were made 
and denied. 
The prosecution's case consisted of introducing 
the film, "Memories Within Miss Aggie", into evidence 
and exhibiting it to the jury and the testimony of three 
experts on the issue of the artistic value of the film. 
The City's first expert was a motion picture 
cameraman who was employed by Brigham Young University and 
also did freelance work on documentaries. (T-77, 84) He 
testified that his "evaluation of the film is due to the 
disproportionate treatment of certain explicit scenes, it 
does not really render itself as a serious art piece, taken 
as a whole." (T-81) 
.4-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The City's second expert was a University of 
Utah English professor (T-102) who, however, was testifying 
as an expert on the philosophy of aesthetics rather than 
as an expert on literature, (T-112, 13) He admitted 
that his basic views were somewhat unique and that he was 
trying to develop a new and consistent theory of aesthetics. 
(T-121) His opinion also was that the explicit sex scenes 
were out of proportion to the overall theme causing the 
audience to lose psychic distance and hence destroying 
the artistic value. The misproportion, in his view, was 
a matter of time—"if the [sex] scene had been three 
minutes or say a fairly short period of time . . . then 
I think it would have made a legitimate point.ff (T-107) 
This witness was primarily concerned about whether the 
theme, which he described as "sexual repression leads to 
fantasy, delusion, psychosis, and results in violence" 
justified the three sexually explicit scenes. (T-104, 5) 
He was of the opinion that these scenes were not adequately 
integrated "to justify this as a great work of art, or 
perhaps even as a serious work of art . . ." (T-109) He 
saw "some difference in [the sexual scenes] because it 
related to the theme of repression leads to psychosis or 
whatever. But is that enough to justify the three divergent 
ones?" (T-119) In short, this witness believed that 
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explicit se.x had to be justified. He admitted that: 
"There are parts of it—for instance the last twenty 
minutes, which had nothing to do with sex—which I 
thought would if taken by itself qualify as a very good 
student production." (T-116) It should be noted that 
the last twenty mintues of the film were about sex, but 
the actors had their clothes on which apparently was 
the test for "sex" used by this witness. (See also T-116 
where the witness times the sex scenes by the length of 
time the actress was "exposed"). 
The City's final expert was a staff member of the 
Utah State Division of Fine Arts and former teacher of film 
appreciation at Brigham Young University. His opinion 
was the film lacked serious artistic value because: 
. . . there are elements [sexually 
explicit scenes] in the film which 
seem to me to be disproportionate; 
that is to say, taken as a whole, 
there are segments of the film which 
somehow violate what seems to me to 
be in other areas perhaps a serious 
intent at perhaps some subtle ex-
7 ~ ~~ position of some serious psychological 
concerns. (T-238) 
The gist of this witness's testimony was that 
the impact of the imagery of the sexual scenes was so 
strong that they overwhelm the viewer causing the viewer 
to lose the overall theme. He testified that his experience 
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in watching the film was that the sexual scenes pulled 
him "out of the film to the point of being self-conscious*" 
(T-24 2) He stated further that the personal feelings and 
attitude of the audience is important in regard to the 
impact of a film (T-237, 24 2) and that he regarded the 
viewing of sexually explicit material as improper. (T-241) 
This witness conceded that the symbolism and other 
literary and artistic intricacies described by the defense's 
cinema critic were present in the film, (T-240, 242) 
The defense put on uncontested evidence that all 
patrons were forwarned that the film contained sexually 
explicit material and that admission was strictly limited 
to persons over twenty-one years of age. 
The defense attempted unsuccessfully to put 
in evidence an opinion poll conducted to determine the 
attitude of the people of the community toward motion 
pictures containing explicit sexual material and two motion 
pictures, which had been previously the subject of obscenity 
prosecutions involving the same parties and where the sole 
issue of the obscenity of the films had been resolved in 
favor of the defendant. (T-14 0, 150,51) 
The great bulk of the evidence that the trial 
court permitted the defendant to submit to the jury concerned 
the artistic and literary value of the motion picture and, 
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indirectly the issue of appeal to prurient interest. 
Three expert witnesses testified that the film did have 
serious literary and artistic value; a professor of English 
literature and creative writing at the University of Utah 
(T-168-92), a professor of fine arts at the University of 
Utah who had eight years experience as a film maker for 
national television (T-192-201), and a professional film 
critic and teacher of film criticism at U.C.L.A. and the 
University of Utah. (T-201-235) The last witness con-
ducted a "voice-over" critique of the film while it was 
being displayed to the jury. (T-207-224) 
The film itself was extremely complex, utilizing 
a great deal of symbolism, filmic references (creating 
a particular mood in different scenes by emulating different 
film makers associated with particular viewpoints) and 
subtle variations in lighting and musical score. Approxi-
mately one-third of the film consisted of three separate 
explicit scenes of ultimate sexual conduct, which if taken 
out of context could be considered to be "pornography". 
However, according to the defense experts, the overall 
purpose and effect of the film was anti-erotic and the maker 
of the film actually sacrificed erotic potential in order 
to establish his theme (T-176, 177, 190, 204, 209, 225) 
which was that the internalizing of sex by indulging in 
-8-
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sexual fantasy, instead of incorporating it in a loving 
relationship, leads to alienation, madness and ultimately 
death rather than the natural life-producing function of 
sex—hardly the sort of message to appeal to the prurient 
interest of a viewer seeking sexual fantasy. In other 
words, the film maker used sexual explicitness to make 
a point against the values usually associated with porno-
graphy much as a film maker might show explicit violence 
in an anti-war film. 
A reading of the testimony of all the experts makes 
it obvious that the prosecution experts, and probably the 
jury, were so shocked by the sexual explicitness, which 
they regarded as per se immoral, that they did not see the 
interrelationships between the scenes; whereas the defense 
experts analyzed the use of sexual explicitness as they 
would any other filmic device, such as violence or suspense, 
to see if the purpose was to convey a message or just 
titillate the audience. 
ARGUJVENT 
POINT I 
SALT LAKE CITY'S OBSCENITY ORDINANCE ON ITS 
FACE VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
A. Salt Lake City's Obscenity Ordinance 
Violates The First Amendment Due To Its Overbreadth. 
-9-
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I n
 State v, Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (1975), at 
least a plurality of this Court apparently held that the 
provisions of the First Amendment to the United States do 
not apply to the State of Utah which is not only in opposi-
tion to a long line of holdings of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (.1973), but makes Utah the only jurisdiction within 
the United States and its territories where residents are 
ostensibly so unprotected. It is respectfully submitted 
that such holding be overturned. 
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 
2607 (1973), the United States Supreme Court set forth 
minimum standards that an obscenity statute must meet to 
comply with the United States Constitution: 
[W]e now confine the permissible 
scope of [obscenity] regulation to 
works which depict or describe 
sexual conduct. That conduct must 
be specifically defined by the ap-
plicable state law, as written or 
authoritatively construed. A state 
offense must also be limited to 
works which, taken as a whole, 
appeal to the prurient interest in 
sex, which portray sexual conduct 
in a patently offensive way, and 
which, taken as a whole, do not have 
serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value. 413 U.S. at 24, 
93 S.Ct. at 2614, 2615 (footnote 
omitted.) 
-10-
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The Miller decision conceded that a state statute does not 
need to repeat the Miller test verbatim. However, the Court 
did require that a statute or ordinance use words 
sufficient to guarantee the protections inherent in the 
test the Court set out. 
Defendant is charged with exhibiting a movie in 
a violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance §32-2-10(3). 
(Section 32-2-10 is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix 
A, infra.) This ordinance does not approach compliance 
with the minimum requirements of Miller. Section 32-2-10 
states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person 
to willfully or knowingly either: 
(3) . . .[E]xhibit . . . any . . . 
motion picture . . . which depicts 
or represents or describes obscene 
sexual conduct, an obscene perform-
ance, obscenities or obscene sado-
masochistic abuse with the intent to 
distribute the same. [Emphasis 
added.] 
A careful reading of this section reveals that the ex-
hibition of four distinct categories of motion pictures are 
declared unlawful. These are: 
(a) Pictures depicting "obscene sexual conduct". 
(b) Pictures depicting an "obscene performance". 
(c) Pictures depicting "obscenities". 
(d) Pictures depicting "obscene sado-masochistic 
abuse". 
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If the jury finds a violation of any one of these four 
categories they can return a verdict of guilty. The use 
of commas and the word "or" in the ordinance make it clear 
that a violation of any one of the four categories will i 
suffice for a conviction. 
The terms "obscene performance" and "obscenities" 
are specifically and individually defined in definitional i 
sections 32-2-10.1(3) and (9) respectively. The terms 
"obscene sexual conduct" and "obscene sado-masochistic 
abuse" are not individually defined. Rather, the term < 
"obscene" is defined in §32-2-10.1(14) and the terms "sexual 
conduct" and "sado-masochistic abuse" are separately defined 
in §32-2-10.1(12) and (10) respectively. The definition of i 
the word "obscene" in §32-2-10.1(14) constitutes an intended, 
but unsuccessful, repetition of the Miller three prong, 
prurient interest, patently offensive, serious value test. 
In part the impermissible overbreadth of the ordinance lies 
in the fact that this test is not applied to the terms 
"obscene performance" and "obscenities" which are separately 
defined in §32-2-10.1 of the ordinance as follows: 
(8) Obscene performance means a 
. . . motion picture . . . which * 
in whole or in part depicts or 
reveals nudity, sexual conduct, 
• sexual excitement or sado-maso-
chistic abuse, or which includes 
I 
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obscenities or explicit verbal 
description or narrative ac-
counts of sexual conduct. 
(9) Obscenities means those slang 
words currently generally rejected 
for regular use in mixed society, 
that are used to refer to genitals, 
female breasts, sexual conduct or 
excretory functions or products, 
either that have no other meaning 
or that in context are clearly used 
for their bodily, sexual or excre-
tory meaning. 
No mention is made in these definitions that a movie de-
picting an "obscene performance" or "obscenities" must 
additionally be found obscene under §32-2-10.1(14) before 
it can be found in violation of the law. Thus, under the 
ordinance, a jury need only base its decision on whether 
a film depicts an "obscene performance" or "obscenities" 
as defined in §32-2-10.1(3) and (9) respectively. Standing 
alone, there can be no question that these definitions are 
overly broad restraints on First Amendment rights. 
The ordinance's definition of "obscenities" [in 
§32-2-10.1(9)] falls short on all counts of the Miller 
three-pronged test. First, there is no requirement under 
the ordinance to look to the movie "as a whole" for an 
"appeal to the prurient interest in sex". Clearly, as an 
example, excretory terms are not prima facie evidence of 
an appeal to the prurient interest in sex. 
-13-
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The second element of the Miller test lacking here i 
is that the film depict "sexual conduct" in a "patently 
offensive" manner. First, the utterance of an obscenity 
is not necessarily a depiction of sexual conduct. Secondly, < 
there is a great difference betv/een something being "patently 
offensive" (required by Miller) and being "generally rejected 
for regular use in mixed society" as stated in the Salt Lake < 
City Ordinance. 
Finally, the Salt Lake City ordinance does not 
protect movies in which obscenities exist but which have { 
"serious literary, artistic, political, or scientic value"* 
As a result, a broad range of movies, clearly in the protected 
area of free speech would be made illegal. * 
Salt Lake City's ban on movies depicting "obsceni-
ties" is clearly in violation of the minimum constitutional 
standards set forth in Miller. Under the present ordinance 
there is a distinct possibility that a jury could find a 
prima facie case of an exhibition of a movie depicting 
obscenities without ever reaching the essential "Miller 
test%>: v.,-,. 
In addition to banning a film for depicting 
i 
"obscenities" the ordinance also prohibits the exhibition 
of films depicting an "obscene performance". However, the 
ordinance's definition of "obscene performance" similarly 
I 
-14-
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fails to comply with the constitutional requirements of 
Miller. Under §32-2-10.1(8) any depiction of nudity or 
sexual conduct in a film is enough for it to be defined 
as an "obscene performance". The United States Supreme 
Court has consistently struck down state statutes and 
ordinances which ban nudity per se. In Jenkins v. Georgia, 
418 U.S. 153 (1974), a case in which the Court reversed a 
conviction for showing the movie "Carnal Knowledge", 
Justice Rehnquist speaking for the Court stated: 
There are occasional scenes of nudity, 
but nudity alone is not enough to make 
materials legally obscene under the 
Miller standards. 418 U.S. at 161, 
94 S.Ct. at 2755. 
One year later, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 
U.S. 205, 95 S.Ct. 2268 (1975), the Court declared a Jack-
sonville ordinance unconstitutional on its face in that it 
barred drive-in theaters from showing any films containing 
nudity. The Court's opinion reveals the impermissible 
effects of such an ordinance: 
[The ordinance] sweepingly forbids 
display of all films containing any 
uncovered buttocks or breasts, ir-
respective of context or pervasive-
ness. Thus it would bar a film 
containing a picture of a baby's 
buttocks, the nude body of a war 
victim, or scenes from a culture 
in which nudity is indigenous. The 
ordinance also might prohibit news-
reel scenes of the opening of an 
-15-
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art exhibit as well as shots of 
bathers on a beach. Clearly all 
nudity cannot be deemed obscene 
even as to minors. 422 U.S. at 
213, 95 S.Ct. at 2274-75. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Salt Lake City has defined "nudity" in §32-2-10.1 (7) 
as follows: 
(7) Nudity means uncovered, or less 
than opaquely covered, human genitals, 
pubic areas, the human female breast 
below a point immediately above the 
top of the areola, or the covered 
human male genitals in a discernibly 
turgid state. 
Thus, it is clear that the Salt Lake City ordinance is as 
broad as that struck down in Erznoznik, supra. If a city 
cannot justify a ban on nudity at drive-in theaters, <a
 { 
fortiori a city certainly cannot justify a ban on nudity 
applied against indoor theaters where minors are excluded. 
A finding of an "obscene performance" need not
 ( 
necessarily be based on a finding that a film contained 
nudity. Section 32-2-10.1(8) allows a jury to find an 
"obscene performance" if any of the following are depicted, < 
either in whole or in part: nudity, sexual conduct, sexual 
excitement, sado-masochistic abuse, obscenities, or explicit 
verbal description or narrative accounts of sexual conduct". I 
The Miller decision stated that mere proscription of "sexual 
conduct" in movies is not enough for a finding that a film 
is obscene. * 
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That case held that an obscenity statute must also be 
limited to works which, taken as a whole, violate the 
three-prong prurient interest, patently offensive, serious 
value test. No such limitation is placed on any of the 
city ordinance grounds for finding an "obscene performance". 
The stifling overbreadth of this portion of the ordinance 
is illustrated by the definition of "sexual excitement" in 
§32-2-10.1(13) (which, as mentioned above, is an adequate 
independent ground for finding an "obscene performance"). 
(13) Sexual excitement means . . . 
the sensual experiences of humans 
engaging in or witnessing sexual 
conduct or nudity. 
The Salt Lake City ordinance bans movies depicting 
either "obscenities" or an "obscene performance" and the 
statutory definitions of these terms are broader than is 
constitutionally permissible. As a result, the ordinance 
must be struck down in its entirety as unconstitutional 
on its face. 
Section 32-2-10(3) further purports to prohibit 
depictions of obscene sexual conduct and obscene sado-maso-
chistic abuse. Such terms are defined in §§32-2-10.1(10) 
and (12) as follows: 
(10) Sado-masochistic abuse means 
flagellation or torture by or upon 
a person who is nude or clad in 
undergarments or in revealing or 
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bizarre costume, or the condition of 
being fettered, bound or otherwise 
physically restrained on the part of 
one so clothed. 
(12) Sexual conduct means human 
masturbation, sexual intercourse, 
or any touching of the covered or 
uncovered genitals, human female 
breast, pubic areas, or buttocks 
of the human male or female, whether 
alone or between members of the same 
or opposite sex or between humans and 
animals in an act of apparent sexual 
stimulation or gratification, which 
term shall include, but not be 
limited to fellatio, cunnilingus, 
pederasty and bestiality. 
In the second part of the three-prong Miller 
test, patently offensive portrayals of sexual conduct 
specifically defined, the Court set forth guidelines 
concerning the type of materials which could be regulated 
as patently offensive representations or descriptions of 
ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simu-
lated, or patently offensive representations or descriptions 
of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions 
of the genitals. The Court later, in Jenkins v. Georgia, 
supra, at 160-61, said that while those guidelines were 
"not an exhaustive catalog of what juries might find patently 
offensive, it was certainly intended to fix substantive 
constitutional limitations, deriving from the First Amendment, 
of the type of material subject to such a determination." 
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Thus, §32-2-10.1(12) goes too far in that it is 
an attempt to regulate more than the Court in Miller allows 
states to regulate. Similarly, §32-2-10.1(10) goes too 
far. Referring back to the Miller substantive constitutional 
limitations, it can be seen that sexual intercourse and 
masturbation fit within those limits as "ultimate sexual 
acts" but the touching aspects of the definition of sexual 
conduct are clearly not ultimate sexual acts nor a lewd 
exhibition of the genitals. Therefore, in defining what 
patently offensive descriptions are, §32-2-10.1(12) goes 
too far. Similarly, sado-masochistic abuse, found in 
§32-2-10.1(10) is not defined in terms that Miller set 
forth as substantive limitations. As a result, the defini-
tions of obscene sexual conduct and sado-masochistic abuse 
are an attempt to regulate material beyond the substantive 
constitutional limits of the First Amendment and as such 
are overly broad and invalid. 
Further, the section defendant is charged with 
violating, §32-2-10(3), is invalid as going beyond the 
limits of Miller. Before considering any tests of obscenity 
the Court in Miller stated: 
This case involves the application 
of a state's criminal obscenity statute 
to a situation in which sexually 
explicit materials have been thrust 
by aggressive sales actions upon 
-19-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unwilling recipients who had in no way 
indicated any desire to receive such 
material. This court has recognized 
that states have a legitimate interest 
in prohibiting dissemination or ex-
hibition of obscene material when the 
mode of dissemination carries with it 
a significant danger of offending the 
sensibilities of unwilling recipients 
or of exposure to juveniles. [Citing 
cases]. It is in this context that 
we are called on to define the standards 
which must be used to identify obscene 
material that a state may regulate with-
out infringing the First Amendment as 
applicable to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
While defendant does not contend that the mere 
fact that consenting adults are involved does not allow 
regulation, see, Paris Adult Theater v. SIaton, 413 U.S. 
49 (1973), our scheme of ordinances in no way limits its 
purported operation to the context of either Miller or the 
commercial exploitation stressed in Paris. That is, our 
ordinance purports to prohibit any "distribution" (defined 
in §32-2-10.1(11) as a transfer of possession or a permis-
sion to be viewed with or without consideration) without 
limiting the context to commercialized exploitation or to 
any form of public accommodation. Our ordinances give a 
jury leeway to convict when a person distributes (allows 
to be viewed without consideration) obscene matter to even 
one person in the privacy of one's home. In fact, since 
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the ordinance applies to speaking as well as every other 
-kind of possible communication, 5 32-2-10(6), "one could be 
punished for swearing to himself if he should accidently 
hit his thumb with a hammer" which was found objectionable 
by this Com t i n S a l t Lake C i t y v . D a v i s o n , 27 Utah 2d 71, 493 
P.2d 301 (1972). As such, the Salt Lake City Ordinances 
go beyond the context of the Miller and Paris decisions 
and purport to prohibit conduct that the Court was not even 
remotely considering as conduct that could be regulated by 
the states,, 
Prior to the 1975 amendment of §32-2-10.1(14) 
discussed in subpart C of this Point, i finding of obscenity 
required a determination of whether the material was presented 
in a patently offensive way which required the jury to 
consider the context in which the film (or other material) 
was shown as well as the material itself* However this 
requirement does not appear i n the current ordinance and 
the jury need not consider whether the circumstances of 
its "distribution" would be offensive. That is, when con-
i - Ji -1 . A. _••; . * _-. ance of an "obscene" word violates 
the ordinance, for example, the jury need not consider 
whether it was uttered by a paratrooper11 going out the door 
of an airplane or said over the public address system at 
an elementary school. Hence even the definition of "obscene" 
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in §32-2-10.1(14) permits an overly broad application of 
the ordinances. 
Finally, the standing to attack the overbreadth 
of the ordinance is not contingent on whether or not the 
film which was shown was obscene. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that standing to challenge overly broad 
statutes is not dependent on whether a defendant's conduct 
could properly be made criminal under a statute rewritten 
to comply with the Constitution. In Bigelow v. Virginia, 
421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222 (1975), the United States Supreme 
Court struck down a Virginia statute which banned all manner 
of abortion advertising. The prosecution claimed that the 
defendant's advertisement could be constitutionally proscribed 
under a narrower statute and as a result the defendant lacked 
standing to attack the overbreadth of the statute. The 
Court's reply was clear and very relevant to the present 
case: 
This Court often has recognized that 
a defendant's standing to challenge 
a statute on First Amendment grounds 
as facially overbroad does not depend 
upon whether his own activity is 
shown to be constitutionally privileged. 
421 U.S. at 809, 95 S.Ct. at 2229. 
The Court cited numerous examples where standing to attack 
statutes was granted to those who engaged in non-privileged 
conduct. Even if the film shown by defendant might be 
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found obscene, nonetheless there is standing to attack the 
overbreadth of the preset "rdinance. 
B. The Overbreadth of the Ordinance 
Cannot be Remedied by a Narrowing Judicial 
Construction. 
In denying Appellant's motion to dismiss the 
complaint on the foregoing grounds, the District Court 
below found the ordinance "constitutional as it conforms 
to the Miller v. California guidelines. And the Court 
finds that that portion of the ordinance which does not 
conform to the Miller v. California guidelines is uncon-
stitutional." (T-246) The trial court did not specify 
which portions were which, nor give an interpretation 
setting out the language which survived the massive surgery. 
Apparently, the court, in effect, repealed the lengthy 
ordinance and attempted to substitute the holding of the 
United States Supreme Court in Miller as the definition of 
the prohibited conduct. While Miller set some constitutional 
parameters it; certainly did not: purport to amend legislation 
by judicial fiat. As stated by that Court: f,We emphasize 
that it is not our function to propose regulatory schemes 
for the States. That must await their concrete lesiglative 
efforts." 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
In Erznoznik v. "Jacksonville, supra:, the Supreme 
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Court struck down an ordinance banning drive-in movies 
containing nudity and the Court stated: 
[A] state statute should not be 
deemed facially invalid unless it 
is not readily subject to a narrow-
ing construction by the state 
courts [citation omitted] and its 
deterrent effect on legitimate 
expression is both real and sub-
stantial. 422 U.S. at 216, 95 
•S.Ct. at 2276. 
The Court further held that a statute banning movies con-
taining nudity was totally incapable of a constitutional 
construction. Under the provisions of Salt Lake City 
Ordinance (Revised) §32-2-10(3), 10.1(8), and 10.1(7), the 
city bans all films depicting "nudity" and does not require 
or even consider a demonstration of appeal to prurient 
interest, patent offensiveness, and lack of serious value. 
As a result, the Salt Lake City ordinance is as incapable 
of a constitutional construction as was the ordinance struck 
down in Erznoznik. 
If the court were asked to judicially read into 
the ordinance an intent to apply the definition of "obscene" 
[found in §32-2-10.1(14)] to the already defined ordinance 
terms of "obscenities" and "obscene performance", two in-
surmountable problems would arise. First, the court would 
have to engage in impermissible judicial legislation. When 
the Salt Lake City Commission enacted this ordinance they 
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enumerated within its provisions their clear intent that 
movies depicting "obscenities" or an "obscene performance" 
could be banned in_ addition to movies displaying "obscene 
sexual conduct" or "obscene sado-masochistic abuse". The 
Commission's choice •_. individually define the terms 
"obscene performance" and "obscenities" was an unambiguous 
expression of legislative intent to distinguish between 
the different ways in which a film could be found in viola-
tion of the ordinance. Any other reading of this ordinance 
would render these detentions do useless surplusage in that 
the definitions of "obscenities" and "obscene performance" 
would not add any additional criteria to the test applied 
through §32-2-10.1(14) (which defines "obscene"). In inter-
preting legislation, a basic rule has always been that a 
iiourt cannot pi: esume ti lat a portion of a lesiglative act 
was intended to be without effect. Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S (1 Cranch) 1 37 (1 803); .Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52 (1926). This principle was recently pointed out 
by Mr. Justice Maughan in the case of State v. Phillips, 
540 I '" 2- I 949 (Utah 1975) , where the Utah state obscenity 
statute was challenged by a defendant book dealer: 
jn or<jer to bring the statute into 
conformance with the Miller standard 
we would have to rewrite it; and 
this no one will seriously advance 
as a function of this court . . . 
A concrete legislative effort is 
not within the province of this 
court. [Dissenting opinion] 540 
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A further indication of legislative intent to 
treat the four categories set out in §32-2-10 (3) as distinct 
grounds for a violation of the ordinance is the act of the 
Salt Lake City Commission of amending the definition of 
"obscene" [found in §32-2-10.1(14)] to make it clear that 
that definition not be superimposed on the existing defini-
tion of "obscene performance". Prior to the amendments 
of April 22, 1975, the definition of "obscene" began as 
follows: 
(14) Obscene shall mean an act, 
depiction, representation, descrip-
tion, obscene performance, or any 
other item, material or conduct in 
this chapter described, whether 
actual or simulated in form, which: 
[violates the prurient interest, 
patently offensive, serious value 
test]. [Emphasis added.] 
The amendments of April 22, 1975, were limited to amending 
the definition of "obscene" found in §32-2-10.1(14). The 
only amendment affecting the portion quoted above was the 
deletion of the term" obscene performance" and its substi-
tution with the word "performance". The only conceivable 
purpose for such a change would be to re-emphasize that 
the definition of "obscene" found in §32-2-10.1(14) was 
not to be superimposed upon the separately defined term of 
"obscene performance" [defined in §32-2-10.1(8)]. The pre-
1975 ordinance established four separate sources for a 
-26-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
violation of §32-2-10(3) (i.e., movies displaying "obsceni-
ties", an "obscene performance", "obscene sexual conduct", 
or "obscene sado-masochistic abuse"). Accordingly, the 
Commission V 1^75 amendment was not necessary to guarantee 
the uniqur-;.£oi : •-. - -^tegory. However, the Commission's 
1975 amendment does act to reaffirm their original legis-
lative intent that the independently defined terms of "ob-
scene performance" and "obscenities" are not subject to any 
other qualifying definitions. 
The; s e c on d b a r t o an in t e rp ret a t i o n w n o^ ul d 
superimpose the definition of "obscene" on the separately 
defined terms of "obscenities" and "obscene performance" 
is that the definition of "obscene" itself is overly broad 
and a jury would be so confused in applying "the law", as 
to L>.~ incapable of rendering a constitutionally adequate 
verdict. The United States Supreme Court recognized this 
danger in Erznoznik, supra, where it declared: 
[Wjhere First Amendment freedoms are 
at stake, we have repeatedly emphasized 
•':...::j;*!}.:.--\ that precision of drafting and clarity 
of purpose are essential. 422 U.S 
at 217, 218, 96 S.Ct. at 2277. 
If the Salt Lake City ordinance were interpreted so as to 
superimpose the tests of §32-2-10.1(14) on the definitions 
found in §§3„-_«-.',, i and (9), it would lack the requisite 
"precision of drafting and clarity of purpose" that are 
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essential in order to comply with the Constitution. Ac-
cordingly, no constitutionally sufficient narrowing con-
struction of the ordinance is possible. 
,.--,,.;* C. Salt Lake City's Obscenity Ordinance 
Violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments1 
Guarantees of Due Process of Law Due to Its 
Vagueness. 
Salt Lake City Ordinance §32-2-10 is not only 
overbroad, but is impermissibly vague as well. The vague-
ness of the ordinance lies in the fact that the test for 
defining patent offensiveness was redefined in the amendment 
of April 22, 19 75, by deleting the requirement to apply 
contemporary community standards as to what is or is not 
patently offensive. Prior to the 19 75 amendment, the 
ordinance [§32-2-10.1(14)] test for patent offensiveness 
was as follows: 
(14) Obscene shall mean [a] . . . 
..-• ^depiction . . . which: 
. . .(b) Is presented in a patently 
offensive way by going substantially 
beyond customary limits of candor in 
description or representation of the 
aforesaid matters in the community |, [Emphasis added.] . . . 
The 1975 amendment (which was in effect on the date of the 
present complaint) repealed this language and substituted 
a new test as follows: 
-28-
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(14) Obscene shall mean [a] . , . 
depiction , , which: 
•..(b) Depicts, describes or 
portrays sexual conduct, as defined 
in subparagraph (12) above, in a 
patently offensive way . . . 
What has resulted is a removal of the standard by which a 
trier of fact must determine patent offensiveness. Under 
this new definition, a juror may apply whatever standards 
he wants to, regardless of whether he thinks they are re-
presentative of the community as a whole. If a juror of 
abnormal sensitivity is "patently offended" by a film, he 
does not need to look to what a majority of persons in the 
community would find patently offensive. Under the amended 
ordinance he is given no guidelines as to whose standards 
of "patent offensiveness" should be applied. Consequently, 
there is no requirement that contemporary community standards 
be applied in determining what is or is not "patently offen-
sive11,. In Miller v. California, supra, the Supreme Cour t 
required that the prurient interest-, patently offensive, 
serious value requirements must a n be determined by "the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards". 
The Court gave the following reason for its requirement: 
[T]he primary concern with requiring 
a jury to apply the standard of "the 
average person, applying contemporary 
community standards" is to be certain 
that, so far as material is not aimed 
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at a deviant group, it will be judged 
by its impact on an average person, 
rather than a particularly susceptible 
x or sensitive person—or indeed a totally 
insensitive one, 413 U.S. at 33, 93 
S.Ct. at 2620. 
Further, the United States Supreme Court in 
Hamling v. United States, 94 S.Ct. 2884, 2901 (1974), in 
discussing whether nationwide standards or local community 
standards were required to determine what is "obscene", 
said that a juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge 
"of the views of the average person in the community or 
visinage from which he comes for making the required deter-
mination, just as he is entitled to draw on his knowledge 
of the propensities of a 'reasonable person1 in other areas 
of the law." The court therein later stated that the result 
of the Miller case as a matter of constitutional law is to 
let a juror sitting in obscenity cases to draw on knowledge
 ( 
of the community or visinage from which he comes in deciding 
what conclusion "the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards" would reach in a given case. Thus, | 
the court did not in Hamling limit the contemporary community 
standards aspect to the first element of the three-prong 
Miller test, but indicated that a juror is entitled to draw ( 
on his knowledge of the average person applying contemporary 
community standards in reaching a decision on obscenity. 
< 
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The clear implication of such language in Hamling is that 
the jury is to apply the standard of the average person 
applying contemporary community standards not only to the 
first prong of the Miller test, whether something appeals 
to the prurient interest, but also to the other two prongs, 
whether something is patently offensive and whether it lacks 
serious value. 
Since the amended ordinance does not provide 
guidelines as to what standards should be applied in deter-
mining whether a film is "patently offensive11, the theater 
operator is left unprotected against arbitrary and unrepre-
sentative verdicts. Accordingly, the definition of the term 
"obscene" found in §32-2-10.1(14) violates the defendant's 
right tu due ufuces^ or lc. AV. ^ r ^ -t be found unconstitutional 
on its face. 
POINT II 
SALT LAKE ciTYfS ORDINANCE ON ITS FACE VIOLATES 
SECTION 15 OF ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
. • . Sect: 01 i 15 of Article I of the Constitut i on of 
Utah states: 
No law shall be passed to abridge 
or restrain the freedom of speech 
or of the press. In all criminal 
prosecutions for libel the truth 
may be given in evidence to the 
jury; and if it shall appear to 
the jury that the matter charged 
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. as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable 
ends, the party shall be acquitted; and 
the jury shall have the right to deter-
mine the law and the fact. (Emphasis 
added.) 
The clear import of the words is that with the 
exception of libel, a specific interference with the rights 
of another, no law shall be passed to abridge or restrain 
the freedom of speech or of the press. While the First 
Amendment contains similar, seemingly clear language, and 
the United States Supreme Court has seen fit over the years 
to read into that clear language an exception as to 
"obscenity", there is no reason that this Court should 
similarly amend the Constitution of Utah. It should be 
i 
noted that this Court has often criticized the United States 
Supreme Court for interpreting the United States Constitution 
contrary to its plain language. It should also be noted 
that the Supreme Court of the United States carved the 
"obscenity" exception to the clear "no law" provision of 
the First Amendment during an era when sex was practically 
unanimously considered a taboo subject. Surely, today, 
there is no rational reason as opposed to reasons deriving 
from faith, to compel infusing a nonexistent exception 
into Section 15, Article I, for communications concerning 
sex and not for violence, for example, which today is 
t 
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generally regarded as more evil than sex. 
This Court in State v, Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 
(Utah 1975), held that Section 1, Article I, was not 
violated by an anti-pornography statute and that freedom 
of expression is not an absolute. However, the Court did 
not address itself to the language of Section 15, Article 
I which is stated in absolute prohibitory terms in contrast 
to the general statement of principles of Section 1. 
Section 15 says no law; it does not say no unreasonable 
law, or, no law except those thought necessary to protect 
"morals" or "normal sensibilities". The framers of the 
Cons titut ion spoke i n abso 1 ute terms when it came to freedom 
of speech and the press. 
Even if "no law" does noc mean absolutely "no law 
except libel" this Court should limit any exception it deems 
necessary to create. In Phillips, supra, at 9 39, it was 
said: "[W]e have no desire t;:o disparage the Idea that every 
person should have the highest possible degree of freedom 
of thought, expression and action consistent with respecting 
similar rights In other individual, ^ , -..e *eifcir-:> 
society generally." The ordinances, under which defendant 
wa s co n vieted, a re certainly not drawn so as to maximi ze 
freedom of thought and expression regarding sex. 
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It can be intelligently argued that the thrusting 
of offensive material of any kind upon another infringes 
that person's rights. Similarly a case can be made for 
protecting children. But to prohibit what is communicated 
to consenting adults, even in private places as the ordinances 
do, is certainly a different matter and can only be justified 
upon the vague grounds of protecting "morals". 
In his concurring opinion in State v. Musser, 223 
P.2d 193 (Utah 1950), Mr. Justice Latimer stated: 
In the final analysis, each 
individual has his own moral 
codes, private and public, and 
what acts might be considered 
as injurious to public morals 
are as numerous as the opinions 
of man. 223 P. 2d at 196". 
The variety in opinions as what is or is not moral is even 
greater today than when Mr. Justice Latimer made the fore-
going statement in 1950. 
To create an exception to Section 15, Article I, 
where a legislature deems it fitting to protect the public 
morals is to open a pandora's box. Given the right political 
makeup, a legislature might decide to prohibit offensive 
speech or film which might encourage large families, or 
small ones; war or pacificism; abortion or the forced bearing 
of an unwanted child. To say that the exception will be 
limited to those expressions which in a jury's view lack 
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serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value 
is no real protection because only the most sophisticated 
of philosophers will attribute any value to that which he 
regards as being immoral. Values vary as much as do morals, 
since the latter is derived from 'the former. 
An argument may also be made that "pornography" 
does not involve the expression of ideas and hence the 
"freedom of speech", being for the purpose of facilitating 
exchange of ideas, is not involved at all. That might be 
so if "pornography" or "obscenity11 is defined as s omething 
that does not convey thought. (Such a definition might 
be difficult, however, since thought can be affected by 
emotional response—for example, the purely emotional 
response to a symphony or abstract painting that conveys 
no specific idea.) However, the instant ordinance is not 
limited to material which does not express ideas. Even 
the proseci it ion wi *•- ^ss*-/- --:*~:'t*.' v - film shown in the 
instant case had a serious theme. (T-104, 237, 24 0) Their 
opinion was that the amount of explicit sex was "dispropor-
t i o n a t e " , (T - 81
 i ] 0 5 , 2 3 7) wh i ch o £ f e n d e d the i r a e s t he t i c 
sense and hence led them to the opinion that it lacked 
" s e r i o u s artistic value". Under Instruction 17 yiven in 
this case, the jury was permitted to convict even if the film 
involved a clear expression of ideas if the jury nonetheless 
•35-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
found it to be "obscene" as defined by the court. 
It is respectfully submitted that the instant 
ordinance is a law which abridges and restrains the freedom 
of speech and of the press and, as such, is in direct 
violation of Section 15, Article I of the Constitution of 
Utah. 
POINT III 
THE SALT LAKE CITY OBSCENITY ORDINANCES VIOLATE 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND THE EQUAL APPLICATION 
OF THE LAWS PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
Section 32-2-10.2, Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, after exempting possession and distribution 
of obscenity by persons involved in law enforcement, re-
search, etc., where such possession or distribution is not 
related to the appeal to prurient interest, goes on to 
state: 
In addition, nothing in this chapter 
shall apply to any recognized his-
torical society or museum, the state 
law library, any county or city or 
town law library, the state library, 
the public library, any library of 
any college or university or to any 
archive or library under the super-
vision and control of the state, 
county, municipality or other political 
subdivision, or to any similar organi-
zation or institution of the same 
class. (Emphasis added.) 
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It should be noted that this exemption is not limited in 
any way to any purpose but would allow any recognized 
(whatever that means) historical society, for example, 
to display a clearly obscene motion picture for profit 
3.nd under ci rcurnstances c] ear 1 y i ndicat Ing an appeal to 
prurient interest. While the exemption pertaining to 
possession and distribution for law enforcement, research, 
etc,, purposes not involvi ng an appeal to prurient interest, 
may be a reasonable classification related to the overall 
purpose of the act, the second, qi loted port! on, is • ilearly 
not. Those organizations and institutions are simply and 
arbitrarily permitted to commit the same acts, for the same 
reasons, and with the same supposed damage to the public 
morals which are forbidden to all other persons and insti-
ll utioins simi 1 ar 1 y situated. Th Is Court h as repeatedly 
held where there is no fair reason, related to the purposes 
Q£ t h e a ct f that would not require equally its extension 
to those it leaves untouched, the act is in violation of 
the Constitution. See, e_.£. / Broadbent v. Gibson, 105 
I Jtah 53, ] .4 0 P. 2d 9 3' * (.] 94 3) ; Gronlund v. Salt Lak e City, 
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948), It is difficult to 
conceive of any fair reason to allow a historical society 
or museum to exhibit an obscene motion picture and outlaw' 
the exhibition of the same motion picture under the same 
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circumstances by any other person or organization. 
POINT IV 
THE SALT LAKE CITY OBSCENITY ORDINANCES ARE UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THE INSTANT 
CASE. 
: Assuming for the argument of this point that the 
ordinances in question are constitutional on their face, the 
conviction in the instant case should be reversed because 
the trial court failed to implement them in such a way as 
to afford defendant the constitutionally mandated protections 
contained within the ordinances. 
First, the trial court defined "obscenity" in the 
language of the ordinance, that is, without specifying any 
standard for determining whether the movie depicted sexual 
conduct in a patently offensive way and whether, taken as 
a whole, it lacked serious literary, artistic, political
 { 
or scientific value. (Instruction No. 19, R-96) The only 
objective standard, concerning an average person applying 
contemporary community standards, was. applied solely to the < 
first element regarding appeal to prurient interest, leaving 
the jury free to apply their own subjective views regarding 
whether it was offensive or had serious value. As argued i 
in Point I, this clearly violates the First Amendment of 
the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the 
r , - ' . . , • •. - •••- ' • < 
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United States. E.g., Hamling v. United States, 94 S.Ct. 
2884, 2901 (1974). Further, in the event this Court does 
find an "obscenity " exception to Section 15, Article I, 
of the Constitution of Utah, such an exception would surely 
be tied to some objective standard rather than permitting 
each jury to decide for themselves whether in their sub-
jective opinion a particular work was obscene. 
It would seem axiomatic that it is not sufficient 
for an ordinance to contain protections and a court to instruct 
on them, if a defendant is not allowed to introduce evidence 
to attempt to convince a jury that he comes within those 
protections. In other words the constitutionally mandated 
protections, such as they are in the instant ordinance, 
can be, and were in the instant case, nullified by evidentiary 
rulings of the trial court. 
The trial court did allow both the prosecution 
and defense to present evidence regarding the literary and 
artistic value of the film, but that court refused the de-
fense proffers of proof regarding the appeal to prurient 
interest and the o::-:nsiveness of the film. 
First the defense sought to introduce an opinion 
poll regarding the attitudes of people in the community 
regarding films containing explicit sex, and the prosecution 
objected prior to the completion of the foundation, (T-123,25) 
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After argument, in the absence of the jury, the objection 
was sustained because "the probative value is not sufficient." 
(T-130) A proffer was made as to the foundation and the 
results which showed that 79% of the population of the 
community indicated that they were not offended by the 
displaying of "hard core pornography" in a theater where 
patrons were forewarned, juveniles were excluded and there 
was no external display of offensive materials. (T-131) 
While it is true that §76-10-1203(3), O.C.A. 
(Supp. 1975) and §32-10-10.3, Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, do not require the prosecution to introduce 
evidence as to the community standard regarding the appeal 
to prurient interest and the offensiveness, and juries have 
been held capable of determining those standards from their 
own knowledge, e.g., Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49, 56 (1973), it does not follow that the defense does { 
not have the right to introduce evidence regarding what the 
community standards are. 
When the views of the public at large are relevant, { 
opinion polls based upon sufficient foundation are admissible 
to prove what those views are. Zippo Mfgr. Co. v. Rodgers 
Imports, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). ' 
When the "community standard" is involved, as 
it is in obscenity cases, it is hard to conceive of more 
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reliable evidence than properly conducted polls except 
for calling all the citizens of the community as witnesses. 
Such polls have been received into evidence in California 
obscenity trials. Pines, The Obscenity Quagmire, CAL. 
STATE BAR J. 561 (Nov./Dec. 1974). 
The importance of evidence concerning the views 
of the public regarding sexual material is made obvious 
by the finding, itself based upon opinion polls, of the 
Presidential and Congressional Commission on Obscenity 
that: 
Americans also seem to have an 
inaccurate view of the opinions 
of others in their communities; 
the tendency is to believe that 
others in the community are more 
restrictive in outlook than they 
actually are. REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND 
PORNOGRAPHY 43 (U.S. Gov. P.O. 
1970). 
It is no wonder that the prosecution would rather juries 
rely on their own knowledge of community beliefs rather 
than scientifically determined evidence. The would-be 
suppressors of sexual frankness have been all too success-
ful in convincing the great majority of people that their 
actual views are held by only a small minority of sinners. 
It is undoubtedly difficult for a juror to express his 
belief that the community is not offended by even "hard 
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core pornography" when he has been subjected to the public 
statements of religious leaders and politicians that society 
is almost unanimously offended by the existence of such 
material. The fact that the statements of such leaders 
are simply not true is not only relevant to the issue of 
"community standards" but also reduces the pressure on 
jurors to conform to a mistaken belief as to what the 
community demands. 
The defense also sought to have described, and 
introduced for comparison purposes, three other motion 
pictures which had been either prosecuted and acquitted or 
dismissed by the prosecution, the sole issue in each case 
being the obscenity of the film. (T-140, T-150,51) Only 
films involved in cases where respondent and appellant 
were parties and the sole issue was whether the film was 
obscene were offered in evidence. The defense sought to 
introduce these materials not only as evidence to be con-
sidered by the jury in determining what materials are 
i 
accepted in the community, (See, £.£. , Woodruff v. State, 
273 A.2d 436, 447 (Md. 1971); In Re Harris, 336 P.2d 305 
(Cal. 1961); Devitt & Blacker, Fed. Jury Instructions Sec. 
41.09, p. 521), but also to allow the jury to rely on pre-
cedent to develop a standard upon which defendant and others 
could rely in the future. The courts have given juries in 
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obscenity cases an unusual amount of discretion. If that 
discretion is exercised completely on an ad. hoc basis by 
each jury, it is impossible to predict what films are 
permissible to show. This not only raises vagueness problems 
in violation of both State and Federal Constitutions but 
has a great potential "chilling effect" on the exercise 
of the freedom of expression. If the defendant, and others, 
cannot safely rely on a series of findings of non-obscenity, 
and show films clearly less offensive and prurient than 
those previously tried, the only safe course is to not 
show films containing any sexual material. 
It is submitted that the freedom of expression 
provisions of both State and Federal Constitutions are not 
satisfied by a statutory provision that films which do not 
violate community standards are protected, when the trial 
court will not permit the defendant to produce evidence 
regarding what those community standards actually are. 
POINT V 
THE SALT LAKE CITY OBSCENITY ORDINANCES AS APPLIED 
IN THE INSTANT CASE ARE IN VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THE FILM EXHIBITED 
BY THE DEFENDANT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IS NOT OBSCENE MATERIAL. 
While the United States Supreme Court in Miller, 
supra, indicated that the determination of obscenity was 
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essentially a matter of fact, that court subsequently in 
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974), stated that 
it would be a serious misreading of Miller to conclude that 
juries have unbridled discretion in determining the exist-
ence of the elements of obscenity. The court held that it 
was the duty of appellate courts to conduct an independent 
review of constitutional claims when necessary, even though 
a properly charged jury unanimously agreed on a verdict of 
guilty. 418 U.S. at 160. In this regard,•§32-2-10, Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, which makes the judge or jury 
the sole trier of what is obscene is clearly unconstitutional. 
Appellant introduced considerable evidence at 
the trial that the film in question not only had serious 
literary and artistic value but also that the erotic appeal 
(i.e., the "prurient appeal") had obviously been sacrificed 
in order to establish the serious theme of the film. Ap-
pellant submits to this Court that because the film, taken 
as a whole, has serious literary and artistic value, it is, 
as a matter of law, protected by the First Amendment and 
that this Court must therefore review the determination of 
the jury. Otherwise, the defendant will be deprived of the 
protection of appellate review held constitutionally neces-
sary in Jenkins, supra. 
-44-
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POINT VI 
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED A TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL 
JURY AS GUARANTEED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, CONSTITUTION 
OF UTAH. 
A. This Court has the Power to Review Cases 
Originating in City Court, Despite Article VIII, 
Section 9, Constitution of Utah, Where an Irregu-
larity in the Proceedings Amounting to a Significant 
Invasion of a Constitutional Right has Occurred. 
While Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution 
of Utah limits appeals of cases originating in a city court 
to cases involving the validity or constitutionality of a 
statute, and this Court has ruled many times that other 
ordinary claims of error cannot be reviewed by this Court, 
e.g., Salt Lake City v. Peters, 16 Utah 2d 245, 398 P.2d 
88 8 (1965), this Court has never resolved the problem re-
garding appeal of such convictions where a violation of 
another specific constitutional provision amounting to a 
denial of due process has occurred. 
I n
 State v. Lyte, 75 Utah 283, 284 Pac. 1006 (1930), 
the defendant in a misdemeanor case attempted to appealf 
alleging the introduction of evidence concerning other crimes 
amounted to a violation of the protection against double 
jeopardy. This Court did not summarily dismiss the appeal 
because the validity of a statute was not involved. Rather, 
the Court analyzed the arguments of the defendant and deter-
mined that the rulings of the court, while erroneous did not 
-4 5-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
constitute double jeopardy. The Court, however, did not 
reach the question of its power to consider appeals where 
a violation of a constitutional right has occurred, saying: 
If therefore the rulings complained 
of do not involve jeopardy, there is 
no necessity to here consider our 
power, in such a case as now before 
us—where judgment of the district 
court is final and non-appealable— 
to grant relief when constitutional 
rights in such particular are invaded. 
284 Pac. 25 1007. 
However the Court did imply that there may be circumstances 
in addition to the unconstitutionality of the statute where 
review by this Court would be proper. 
However, since the rulings do not 
involve questions on which an appeal 
may be taken, nor jurisdiction of 
the court, nor regularity of its 
proceedings, but mere questions 
as to the admissability of evi-
dence . . . the appeal must be 
dismissed. 284 Pac. at 1008. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The instant case places the question left open 
in Lyte, supra, squarely before the Court, for as argued 
in subpoint B, infra, the denial of the right to an im-
partial jury does clearly amount to a question affecting 
the "regularity of the proceedings" and "jurisdiction of 
the court". 
The issue is actually one of an apparent conflict 
in two provisions of the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 
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9 and Article I, Section 12. It is respectfully submitted 
that this conflict should be resolved in favor of the in-
herent power of this Court to enforce the protections 
guaranteed defendants in the Constitution. Article VIIIf 
Section 9 does, itself, guarantee the right to a de novo 
trial in the district court which implicitly guarantees a 
trial meeting the requirements of due process of law including 
the submission of the facts to an untainted jury. For 
example, if the district court, in violation of Article VIII, 
Section 9 should deny a defendant a trial at all and convict 
him summarily, it could hardly be argued that the same 
Article would deprive the defendant of any avenue of relief 
in this Court. 
It is respectfully submitted that the provision 
against further appeal of a misdemeanor case in Article VIII 
assumes a trial in district court which was in accordance 
with Article I, Section 12 and that the defendant was accorded 
due process of law there. However, where the defendant was 
denied the right to an impartial jury, this assumption is 
invalid and it is necessry for this Court to provide relief, ' 
not only to enforce Article I, Section 12, but also to give 
validity to the right to trial in district court contained in 
Article VIII, Section 9. 
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B. The Receipt of Information Outside of 
Court by Seven Jurors Which Did, or Could Have, 
Influenced Their Verdict Amounted to a Denial 
of the Right to an Impartial Jury. 
In denying defendant's motion for a mistrial based 
on the improper conveying of information to members of the 
jury (T-252) and in the motion for a mistrial on the same 
grounds, (R-392) the trial court indicated that there was a 
lack of evidence that the information had influenced the jury. 
The Court, after interviewing the two jurors who had learned 
of the investigation, indicated he was not satisfied that 
this knowledge had not affected the jury (T-167), and on 
other occasions indicated his concern as to the possible 
effect. (T-4, 18, 92, 158, 165, 251) It is apparent that 
the trial court believed the test to be, in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, that improper [and the trial court did 
find that the statements by one of the attorneys for plaintiff 
i 
to the press were improper, (T-158)] communications to a 
jury are presumed to be nonprejudicial and that the jury is 
to have presumed to follow the instructions to only consider 
the evidence. 
This is not the law in Utah. In State v. Thorne, 
39 Utah 208, 117 Pac. 58 (1911), a juror had merely made a 
phone call without permission after the case had been sub-
mitted to the jury. There was no evidence whatsoever as to 
with whom he had conversed or the subject matter. This ^ 
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Court in reversing the conviction held: 
From the misconduct disclosed and 
the exposure of the juror to harmful 
influences, prejudice is presumed, 
and the burden cast on the state to 
show what the communication was, and 
that it was harmless and could not 
have influenced or affected the de-
liberations of the juror or his ver-
dict. 117 Pac. at 66. (Emphasis 
added.) 
• * * 
To say that the accused 
cannot sustain his claim of pre-
judice until he also shows that the 
juror talked about something harmful 
to the accused's rights is to fritter 
away the constitutional and statutory 
provisions requiring the jury to be 
kept secluded from all influences. 
It is enough that the state, to 
sustain the verdict against the 
accused under such circumstances, 
is permitted to show that the con-
duct, though wrongful and in dis-
obedience of the statute and the 
directions of the court, neverthe-
less was harmless, by showing all 
that was said and done, and by clearly 
and affirmatively showing that the 
accused was not, nor could have been, 
prejudiced thereby. The state not 
having done this, is not entitled to 
hold the verdict. 117 Pac. at 67. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In State v. Anderson, 65 Utah 415, 237 Pac. 941 
(1925), a juror had been given a ride back and forth to 
court by one of the complaining witnesses. The trial court 
was satisfied that there was no intention to influence the 
juror and affidavits by the juror and witness declared that 
there had been no conversation concerning the case and that 
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the courtesy extended to the juror had in no way affected 
his decision. In reversing the conviction on the grounds 
the defendant had been denied trial by an impartial jury in 
violation of Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution, the 
Court stated: 
The authorities, however, all agree 
that any conduct or relationship 
between a juror and a party to an 
action during the trial that would 
or might, consciously or unconscious-
ly, tend to influence the judgment of 
the juror authorizes and requires the 
granting of a new trial, unless it is 
made to appear affirmatively that the 
judgment of the juror was in no way 
affected by such relationship or that 
the parties by their conduct waived 
their right to make objection to such 
conduct. 237 Pac. at 943. (Emphasis 
added.) 
I n
 State v. Ahrens, 25 U.2d 222, 479 P.2d 786 
(1971), the court held that the unauthorized viewing by a 
juror of a city office where an embezzlement was alleged 
to have occurred and some conversation with the employees 
there required reversal, i^ ccording to the dissenting 
opinion, the juror saw nothing and learned nothing that 
the rest of the jury did not see and learn during the 
course of the trial and during an official view. This 
Court nonetheless stated: 
We have no way of determining 
whether or not the conduct of the 
juror influenced his judgment in 
arriving at a verdict. We adhere 
to the rule stated in prior de-
cisions of the court that the law 
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requires of the juror such conduct 
during the trial that his verdict 
may be above suspicion as to having 
been influenced by any conduct on 
his part during the trial. 25 U.2d 
at 225. 
It can hardly be argued that these cases are dis-
tinguishable on the grounds that, in the instant case, the 
misconduct was on the part of a prosecutor rather than of 
the jurors. The effect on the jury is the same, and, if 
misconduct is relevant, it would seem that misconduct by a 
prosecutor, supposedly familiar with proper procedures and 
a duty to insure fairness, is considerably more serious 
than similar conduct by a layman. In State v. Maynard, 9 
Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959), the actions of the trial 
court in communicating with a deliberating jury in the 
absence of counsel was held to be an improper violation of 
privacy of the jury designed to preserve it from outside 
influence. 
It is therefore clear that when an impropriety 
regarding a jury occurs, the issue is not whether the jury 
has been shown to be influenced, but whether they could 
have been influenced, consciously or unconsciously. 
Here, at least four, if not five, jurors had been 
made aware that the Attorney Generalfs Office through the 
L.D.S. Church had made inquiry to see if they were "pro 
or anti-pornography". That is, they were made aware that 
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both church and state were watching them. They were further 
informed that, as a result of this inquiry, five of them 
were expected to be favorable to the prosecution and two were 
expected to not acquit no matter what happened at the trial. 
(Transcript of television newscast, Exhibit 13D) To say 
that jurors would not be at least subconsciously influenced 
by the fact that their bishop was expecting them to convict 
is not only speculative but ignores the realities of human 
nature. The prosecutor's comment also assumed that an ac-
quittal would only be returned by a person who was pro-
pornography which certainly might have an effect on a juror 
who was opposed to "pornography" but harbored a doubt as to 
whether the film was legally obscene.
 { 
In addition, the juror who was informed by a 
neighbor that the Attorney General's Office wanted to know 
if she partied a lot or was a good girl might certainly feel < 
pressure to keep her reputation as a good girl by deciding 
in accordance with what was impliedly a good girl's duty. 
Similarly, can it be said with confidence that the juror 4 
who heard of the investigation by way of his ward secretary 
would feel no unconsious pressure? 
Running through all the cases is the concern for ^ 
not only actual fairness but the appearance of fairness. 
For example, in State v. Crank, 105 Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 
i 
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(1943), it was said: "The verdict of the jury, like Caesar's 
wife, must be above suspicion," 
It certainly did not give the defendant confidence 
in the fairness of the jury, to have the prosecutor publicly 
announce, prior to the jury hearing the evidence, that the 
jury was pro-prosecution. But of more importance is the 
confidence of the public regarding a trial which, not only 
was given wide publicity, but involved issues concerning the 
community as a whole. Even a columnist for the Deseret News, 
which was hardly sympathetic to the defense, (see Exhibits 
1D-7D) commented in reference to Prosecutor Hansen's prediction: 
"If two jurors had their minds made up before the trial even 
started, the proceedings can hardly be called fair." Decker, 
A Tainted Porn Jury?, Deseret News, July 2, 19 76, p. A4. 
The Constitutional Law of this state is clear 
that a defendant has an absolute right to a jury which is 
clearly free from even the possibility of outside influence. 
It is respectfully submitted that a jury which has been 
informed that they are expected to acquit if they are moral 
people cannot be presumed to be free of conscious or un-
conscious influence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully 
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s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e j udgmen t o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t s h o u l d 
be r e v e r s e d . 
R e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d , 
/JOHN D. O'CONNELL 
A t t o r n e y f o r A p p e l l a n t 
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APPENDIX A 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City (19 75) 
Sec. 32-2-10. Obscene or lewd acts and prepara-
tion and dissemination of obscene materials or hard-core 
pornography—"hard-core pornography" defined. It shall be 
unlawful for any person willfully or knowingly to either: 
(1) Associate in a lewdf lascivious or obscene 
manner with any person, whether married or unmarried, engage 
in open and gross lewdness, lascivious or obscene conduct, 
or make any open, public, indecent or obscene exposure of 
his or her private parts, or the person or private parts of 
another; or 
(2) Procure, counsel or assist any person: (a) 
To act in a lewd or obscene manner; (b) To engage in obscene 
sexual conduct, an obscene performance or obscene sado-
masochistic abuse; or (c) To make any indecent exposure of 
his own or any other person's private parts; or 
(3) Import, write, compose, stereotype, print, 
design, copy, draw, paint or otherwise prepare, publish, 
sell, offer for sale, display, exhibit by machine or other-
wise or distribute or furnish any writing, paper, book, 
picture, drawing, magazine, pamphlet, print, design, figure, 
still or motion picture, photograph or negative thereof, 
photocopy, engraving, sound recording, card, instrument or 
other such article which depicts or represents or describes 
obscene sexual conduct, an obscene performance, obscenities 
or obscene sado-masochistic abuse with the intent to dis-
tribute the same. 
(4) Buy, procure, receive or have in his possession 
any such writing, paper, book, picture, drawing, magazine, 
pamphlet, print, design, figure, still or motion picture, 
photograph or negative thereof, photocopy, engraving, sound 
recording, card, instrument or other article which depicts 
or represents or describes obscene sexual conduct, an obscene 
performance, obscenities, or obscene sado-masochistic abuse 
with the intent to distribute the same; or 
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(5) Write, compose or publish, display publicly 
or permit to be displayed any notice or advertisement for 
any writing, paper, book, picture, drawing, magazine, pamph-
let, print, design, figure, still or motion picture, photo-
graph or negative thereof, photocopy, engraving, sound 
recording, card, instrument or other article which depicts 
or represents or describes obscene sexual conduct, an obscene 
performance, or obscene sado-masochistic abuse or any obsceni-
ties for advertising purposes; or 
(6) Sing or speak an obscene or lewd song, ballad, 
or any other obscenity 03: lewd words in any public place or 
in the presence of other persons; or 
(7) Require as a condition to a sale, allocation, 
consignment or delivery for resale of any paper, magazine, 
book, periodical, publication, or other merchandise, that the 
purchaser or consignee receive any material, which material 
is obscene or is believed by the purchaser or consignee to 
be obscene or to deny or threaten to deny a franchise or 
license, or revoke or threaten to revoke, or impose any 
penalty, financial or otherwise, by reason of the failure or 
refusal of such purchaser or consignee to accept such material 
or to do such acts by reason of the return of such material. 
Sec. 32-2-10.1 Definitions. As used in this 
chapter, unless the content requires otherwise: 
(1) Willfully shall mean simply a purpose or 
willingness to commit the act or to omit an act required herein. 
(2) Knowingly shall mean to have actual or con-
structive knowledge of the contents of the subject matter. 
A person has constructive knowledge if a reasonable inspection 
under the circumstances would have disclosed the nature of 
the subject matter and if the failure to inspect is for the 
purpose of avoiding such disclosure. 
(3) Advertising purposes shall mean purposes of 
propagandizing in connection with the commercial sale of a 
product or type of product, the commercial offering of a 
service or the commercial e^diibition of an entertainment. 
(4) Displays publicly shall mean the exposing, 
placing, posting, exhibiting, or in any fashion displaying 
in any location, whether public or private, an item in a 
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manner that it may be readily seen and its content or charac-
ter distinguished by normal unaided vision viewing it from 
a public thoroughfare, depot or vehicle. 
(5) p e r s o n shall not be limited to individuals 
only but shall include public and private corporations, firms, 
joint associations, partnerships and the like. The word 
"person" as used herein shall apply to a natural person and 
shall apply equally to the male and female genders. 
(6) Furnishes means to sell, give, rent, loan or 
otherwise provide. 
(7) Nudity means uncovered, or less than opaquely 
covered, human genitals, pubic areas, the human female 
breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola, 
or the covered human male genitals in a discernibly turgid 
state. For purposes of this definition, a female breast is 
considered uncovered if the nipple only or the nipple and 
areola only are covered. 
(8) Obscene performance means a play, motion 
picture, dance, show or other presentation, whether pictured, 
animated or live, performed before an audience and which in 
whole or in part depicts or reveals nudity, sexual conduct, 
sexual excitement or sado-masochistic abuse, or which includes 
obscenities or explicit verbal description or narrative 
accounts of sexual conduct. 
(9) Obscenities means those slang words currently 
generally rejected for regular use in mixed society, that are 
used to refer to genitals, female breasts, sexual conduct or 
excretory functions or products, either that have no other 
meaning or that in context are clearly used for their bodily, 
sexual or excretory meaning. 
(10) Sado-masochistic abuse means flagellation or 
torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in under-
garments or in revealing or bizarre costume, or the condition 
of being fettered, bound or otherwise physically restrained 
on the part of one so clothed. 
(11) Distribute means to transfer possession of 
or permit to be viewed, heard or examined, with or without 
consideration. 
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(12) Sexual conduct means human masturbation, 
sexual intercourse or any""touching of the covered or un-
covered genitals, human female breast, pubic areas or 
buttocks of the human male or female, whether alone or 
between members of the same or opposite sex or between 
humans and animals in an act of apparent sexual stimula-
tion or gratification, which term shall include, but not 
be limited to fellatio, cunnilingus, pederasty and bestial-
ity. 
(13) Sexual excitement means the condition of 
human male or female genitals or the breasts of the female 
when in a state of sexual stimulation, or the sensual exper-
iences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct 
or nudity. 
(-1-4) Obscene shall mean an act, depiction, repre-
sentation, description, performance, or any other item, 
material or conduct in this chapter described, whether 
actual or simulated in form, which: 
(a) Taken as a whole, the average person would 
find appeals to the prurient interest when applying con-
temporary community standards; and ( 
(b) Depicts, describes or portrays sexual conduct, 
as defined in subparagraph (12) above, in a patently 
offensive way; and 
(c) Taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, i 
artistic, political or scientific value, 
(15) Prurient interest shall mean a shameful or 
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion. 
Section 32-2-10.2. Persons and institutions i 
exempted from ordinance. This ordinance shall not apply 
to persons who may possess and distribute obscene material 
or participate in the other conduct which is proscribed when ^ 
such possession, distribution, or participation occurs in 
the course of bona fide educational, artistic, scientific, 
I 
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medical, or comparable research or study or in the course 
of law enforcement activities or in other like circum-
stances where the nature of possession, distribution, or 
participation is not related to the appeal to prurient 
interest; in addition, nothing in this chapter shall apply 
to any recognized historical society or museum, the state 
law library, any county or city or town law library, the 
state library, the public library, any library of any college 
or university or to any archive or library under the super-
vision and control of the state, county, municipality or 
other political subdivision, or to any similar organization 
or institution of the same class. 
Section 32-2-10.3. Sole trier. The judge or the 
jury shall be the sole trier of what is obscene. 
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